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Non-technical summary
Do part-time workers earn lower hourly wage rates than full-timers? If this is
true, this wage dispersion would not only a¤ect the income distribution, but it
would also decrease the labor supply for part-time jobs. A look at the gross hourly
wage rates shows that indeed employees with fewer hours earn lower wages. To
some extent, this is due to di¤erences in quali…cation, experience and other wage
determining characteristics. But, even after controlling for these variables, a
signi…cant wage di¤erential between part-time and full-time employees remain.
Economic theory provides many reasons why and how the gross hourly wage rate
can be determined by the working hours. However, the shape of the wage-hours
pro…le is not clearly determined by the theoretical arguments. Therefore, in this
paper the impact of working hours on the gross hourly wage rate of West German
women is analyzed. We use a simultaneous wage-hours model which fully takes
into account the labor supply decision. Furthermore, we relax the assumption
that the e¤ect of working hours on wages is the same for all individuals.
Two primary observations should be made about our results. First, our esti-
mates show that the hourly wage rate is strongly a¤ected by the working hours.
Women who work less than 20 hours a week have to accept substantial wage
di¤erentials. However, the hourly wage rate of jobs with 20 to 38 hours does
not di¤er signi…cantly. Somewhat striking are the wage reductions for overtime
hours. This result is due to the fact, that the majority of women working over-
time are not compensated for these additional hours. Second, we detect di¤erent
wage-hours pro…les for some speci…c groups. Women working in the trade or
service sector experience a ‡atter wage-hours curve than those in other sectors.
Also the previous labor market experience determines the shape of the wage-
hours locus.
These results show that the wage distribution does not seem to be the driving
factor for the marginal importance of part-time work. Thus, alternative expla-
nations, such as the shortage of part-time jobs should be considered.
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Abstract:
In this paper the impact of working hours on the gross hourly wage rate of West
German women is analyzed. We use a simultaneous wage-hours model which
takes into account the participation decision. First, our estimates show that the
hourly wage rate is strongly a¤ected by the working hours. In order to avoid
any assumptions about the functional form, we estimate linear spline functions.
Second, we detect di¤erent wage-hours pro…les for speci…c groups of individuals.
Despite these di¤erences, the wage reduction for jobs with less than 20 hours
a week and for overtime hours turns out to be a robust result. However, the
hourly wage rate of jobs with 20 to 38 hours does not di¤er signi…cantly. Third,
for West German women, the exogeneity assumption of working hours in the
wage regression must be rejected if the wage-hours locus is assumed to be the
same for all individuals. As a result of this the wage rate of full-time employees
is overestimated in the standrad OLS estimation.
JEL classi…cation: J22, J24, J31
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1. Introduction
Do part-time workers earn lower hourly wage rates than full-timers? A look at
the gross hourly wage rates shows that indeed employees with fewer hours earn
lower wages. Partly, this is due to di¤erences in quali…cation, experience and
other wage determining characteristics. But, what about the remaining wage
di¤erencial? This is an often discussed issue by workers, employers and policy
makers. On the one hand, part-time jobs1 in Germany are often still regarded
as lousy jobs. On the other hand, labor market policy is promoting part-time
work as a means to reduce unemployment. So, how about the performance of the
praised part-time jobs in Germany? Actually, the question about potential wage
di¤erentials does not only concern people in marginal jobs, that is, employees
who work below the threshold for social security coverage, but also those working
less than the standard working hours, that are negotiated among the unions and
the employers. Analyzing the existence and the size of the wage di¤erentials
among jobs with di¤erent working hours is an interesting issue itself, but it
becomes even more urgent since it has far-reaching implications for the labor
supply decision of individuals. Negative wage premiums for part-time jobs, for
example, may decrease the labor supply for those jobs. Compared to a situation
with equalized wages, it is more likely that people work either full-time or leave
the labor market.
In Germany, the part-time rate for women was about 33.9 percent in 1995, but
substantial di¤erences between East and West Germany still exist. In East Ger-
many, only 20.8 percent of the employed women worked part-time, in West Ger-
many the part-time rate was 37.3 percent. Compared to women, the part-time
rate of men is much lower and varies between 2.9 percent in East Germany and
3.2 percent in West Germany. Given that part-time work is not very widespread
in Germany, the existence of a negative wage di¤erential between full-timers and
part-timers seems to be a plausible explanation. Therefore, the object of this
1 I de…ne all jobs with less than 35 hours a week as part-time jobs.
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paper is to check whether Germans earn lower hourly wage rates when working
fewer hours. We con…ne ourselves to West-German women, because the other
groups of part-time workers are too small to draw convincing results.2
In the theoretical literature, we can …nd several explanations for a dependence
of wages on hours. First, the labor costs of the …rm do not increase propor-
tionally with hours worked, because part-time jobs cause relatively higher …xed
costs for the …rm (e.g. recruiting and training costs, arranging a work-place and
coordination costs). Therefore, Oi (1962) draws the conclusion that lower wage
rates are paid for part-time jobs than for full-time jobs.
Second, the amount of working hours may also in‡uence productivity. Given
that the hourly wage rate equals marginal productivity of labor, or at least
depends on the marinal productivity, wages may also react to changes in working
hours. Barzel (1973) argued that productivity will …rst rise slowly due to ”start-
up” e¤ects at the beginning of a working day. Thus, the productivity of the last
hour of a ”normal” working day still exceeds the average daily productivity, which
leads to lower wage rates for part-time workers. Then, marginal productivity may
decline at higher working hours, which results in a lower marginal wage rate for
overtime hours. He starts from the assumption that the marginal productivity of
labor is zero at between twelve and fourteen hours. Contrary to these conclusions,
Tummers and Woittiez (1991) argue that reduced working hours may raise hourly
productivity because they avoid the negative fatigue e¤ect of a long working day
or they may reduce unproductive time, or ”slack”. That is, marginal productivity
reaches its maximum at less hours than the ”normal” working hours. In this
setting, gross part-time wages - given they are based on labor productivity -
should be higher.
In Germany, most of the jobs without social security coverage, the so called
marginal jobs, are taxed by a lump sum tax at the expense of the employer. The
2 The share of part-time work among West German men is only 3.2 percent, that is about
100 observations in our sample. In East Germany, 270 of the individuals in the selected
sample work less than 35 hours, of which 30 are men.
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empirical results of Schwarze (1998) lead one to suppose that employers shift the
entire tax burden (15 percent of the gross wage rate in 1995) on to the employees.
As a result of this, the gross hourly wage rates of these jobs should be about
15 percent below those for comparable full-time jobs. Another explanation for
wages dependent on hours is based on the idea of compensating wage di¤erentials
or a potential lack of part-time jobs. In short, there are reasons for supposing
that there exist substantial wage di¤erences between full-time and part-time
jobs in Germany, and especially between jobs with and without social security
coverage. According to the importance of the di¤erent e¤ects, the resulting wage
di¤erentials could be either positive or negative.
However, most empirical labor market studies, especially for Germany, ignore
that wages might be a¤ected by the weekly working hours. Recent exceptions
include Schwarze (1998) and Wolf (1998) for Germany, Tummers and Woittiez
(1991) for the Netherlands, Blank (1990) and Averett/Hotchkiss (1997) for the
US, Main (1988) and Ermisch/Wright (1991) for Great Britain and Ilmakun-
nas/Pudney (1990) for Finland. The majority of the analyses come to the con-
clusion that jobs with less hours are paid by a lower hourly wage rate. Even so,
there exist contradicting evidence. The results di¤er strongly between countries,
gender and the various econometric methods. It turned out that in order to fully
measure the e¤ect of working hours on wages, the labor supply decision must
be taken into account. However, such a study that treats the working hours as
endogenous does not exist for German data. The aim of this paper is to close
this gap.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we show how the
impact of hours on wages can be captured empirically and in section 3, the data
underlying the empirical part of the paper are described. Section 4 presents the
econometric model. The estimation results are discussed in section 5. The last
section summarizes the …ndings and concludes.
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2. Empirical methodology
A simple way to capture the e¤ect of hours on wages is to include the weekly
working hours as an exogenous variable in the standard wage equation. Schwarze
(1998), for example, used dummy variables to capture the e¤ect of marginal jobs
and part-time work on the hourly wage rate. The coe¢cients turned out to
be signi…cantly negative, that is, people with reduced working hours earn lower
wages, even after controlling for di¤erences in human capital and other wage
determining characteristics. However, these results could be biased. In analyzing
the impact of working hours on wages, we have to deal with two problems.
First, economic theory suggests that individuals share their time among leisure
and working hours h in such a way that their utility function U(h; Y ) is maxi-
mized. Y describes the corresponding labor earnings plus the non-labor income.
Even if employees cannot always freely choose their working hours, the assump-
tion of exogenous hours is too restrictive. The labor supply decision depends,
among others, on the opportunity costs of labor, that is, the o¤ered wage rate.
Thus, working hours themselves depend on the potential market wage rate. In
this setting, the two variables of interest are mutually dependent. Ignoring this
relation may produce misleading results.
Second, provided that wage di¤erentials among jobs with di¤erent working
hours do exist, they also e¤ect the decision to enter the labor market. These two
considerations suggest that the labor supply decision must be fully taken into
account.
Third, this approach assumes that all individuals follow the same wage-hours
pro…le. But, it may be argued that the …xed costs or the productivity curves
di¤er among quali…cation groups, …rm sizes or industry sectors. As a result, the
impact of working hours on wage rates could depend on individual characteris-
tics. The extended standard wage equation ignores the compositional di¤erences
between part-time and full-time workers. Thus, the traditional single-equation
wage function has some shortcomings that we want to overcome in our model.
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Whereas several economists attempt to tackle the problem of endogeneity,
only Blank (1990) allows for di¤erent wage-hours pro…les for speci…c groups of
individuals. The bunch of new approaches di¤er in that the hours equation is
speci…ed either as a discrete choice model or as a continuous model and whether
selection in the labor market is explicitly taken into account. I will now brie‡y
discuss three empirical methods applied in the literature..
An easy methodology to account for the endogeneity of hours is to generate
an instrumental variable (IV) representing the expected working hours of each
employee. This instrument can be created using a set of variables that are cor-
related with the working hours but not with the hourly wage rate. Since hours
and wages are mutually dependent, it is extremely di¢cult to …nd appropri-
ate instruments. However, if the instrument is only weakly correlated with the
hours, the IV-approach can produce biased estimates of the coe¢cients in the
wage equation (Staiger/Stock, 1997). Biddle and Zarkin (1989) applied the IV-
approach to estimate a wage-hours model for American men. Their empirical
results strongly reject the neoclassical assumption that wages are independent
of hours worked. Instead, their estimates imply that the wage-hours relation is
dome shaped with a peak at about 2500 annual hours. In addition they …nd
that OLS estimates are biased. However, both the problem of selectivity bias
and the compositional di¤erences between part-time and full-time workers are
ignored. Given the high participation rate of American men, the former simpli…-
cation should not cause a severe problem. Averett and Hotchkiss (1997) criticize
further that the IV-approach fails to account for a discontinuous budget curve.
Therefore, they suggest to estimate a sequentially ordered response selectivity
model. By this means they switch to a discrete choice method for the hours
estimation and obtain selectivity-corrected full-time and part-time wages for all
observations.
The second approach is a joint wage-hours model. Mo¢t (1984) combines a
discrete labor supply model with a wage-hours locus o¤ered by the employer.
These two functions are estimated simultaneously. The results con…rm Barzel’s
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hypothesis of an S-shaped budget constraint. Hourly wages of older women in
the US rise with hours at a slowing rate and peak at about 34 hours per week.
The drawback of this model is that the working hours and the participation
decision are determined by the same set of variables. In view of the …xed costs of
work and involuntary unemployment one would expect that the worker’s choice
of hours is separately determined from the (partly involuntary) decision to work
or not to work. Tummers and Woittiez (1991) tackle this problem by estimating
a simultaneous wage and labor supply model with hours restrictions. They show
that in the Netherlands the before-tax hourly wage rate is highest for women
working 28 hours a week and slopes downwards for additional hours.
Finally, a two stage discrete choice approach was estimated by Simpson (1986)
and Main (1988). They adopt a model for wage comparison with selection bias
which is extensively used for union and non-union wage di¤erentials (Lee, 1978).
Separate wage equations are estimated for full-time and part-time workers - in-
cluding an inverse Mills ratio capturing the potential selection bias. The results
indicate that the wage di¤erential between part-time and full-time workers in
Canada decreases from 13 to 10 percent after adjusting for the selectivity. Main
(1988) concludes that full-time jobs of British women are paid 15 percent more
than part-time jobs - half of the total di¤erential is due to the di¤erential way
in which part-time jobs paid less for the same characteristics than full-time jobs.
A comparable study for British women establish smaller di¤erentials between
full-time and part-time workers (Ermisch/Wright, 1991). Even so, the analy-
sis indicates that the di¤erences in women’s expected wage o¤ers are a crucial
determinant of wether they work part-time or full-time. Blank (1990) extends
this switching regression model to a simultaneous model which contains three
endogenous variables, that is, participation, part-time work and the wage rate.
This enables her to measure the e¤ect of part-time work on wages in such a way
that the selection into part-time work is fully taken into account. In contrast
to other studies, her results indicate that once the choices to enter the labor
market and to work part-time are accounted for, female part-time workers in the
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US appear to earn higher wages across all occupations than equivalent full-time
workers. The fact that accommodating the selection into part-time jobs reverses
the outcome implies that those women who work part-time would also receive
lower wages if they held a full-time job. Furthermore, the endogenous switch-
ing regression model of Blank (1990) provides di¤erent coe¢cients of the wage
equation for part-timers and full-timers.
We generalize the model of Blank (1990) with respect to the hours equation
by assuming that people choose among all possible number of working hours not
only between part-time and full-time work.3 Compared to the discrete approach,
this allows for computation of any di¤erentials related to hours worked, not just
among part-time and full-time work. Furthermore, doing this we avoid the re-
quired assumption about the frontiers between di¤erent labor market regimes.
We estimate the e¤ect of hours on the wage rate using a simultaneous model
of wages, working hours and the selection to enter the labor market. In or-
der to estimate the e¤ect of working hours on wages, we include hours in the
wage equation in three alternative ways. Further, we use interaction terms be-
tween working hours and other exogenous variables to allow for di¤erent e¤ects
of working hours for di¤erent education levels, experience groups, …rm sizes and
industries. Doing this overcomes the drawbacks of the OLS-wage-equation dis-
cussed above all at once. We …rst present a model which enables to estimate
di¤erent wage-hours pro…les for all labor supply regimes, taking into account the
complete labor supply decision.
3. The data and some descriptive …gures about
working hours and wages in West Germany
The empirical part of the paper is based on the German Socio-economic Panel
(GSOEP) for the year 1995. The GSOEP is a yearly household panel which has
3 Since, in this paper we focus on wage di¤erentials, potential hours restrictions on the
labor supply are not taken into account.
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been conducted since 1984 in West Germany and since 1990 in East Germany.
The …rst wave in 1984 contains almost 6000 households. In this sample about
4500 are sampled randomly from the population of West Germany. Due to the
domestic concept, this random sample also contains some households of other
nationalities. The other sub-sample of about 1500 households is a strati…ed
sample of immigrants and guest-workers from Italy, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia
and Greece who lived in Germany in the period during which information was
collected. In this study, we left out the sample of immigrants and guest-workers
and the Non-European households of the …rst sample, because their labor supply
behavior and the wage determination may be substantially di¤erent from those
of Germans. Since we are interested in the wage structure of the German labor
market, we dropped all self-employed women and those working in the farming
sector. Our selected sample contains only women between the ages of 20 and 60
who are not in apprenticeship. There remain 2415 observations of West German
women, which provide all necessary information. The descriptive statistics of the
sample are given in table A1 in the Appendix.
Figure 1 provides a histogram of weekly working hours and mean hourly wage
rates in the sample4. We generated nine categories of working hours from 1 to
60 hours a week5 and another group for all people out of work. Women who do
not participate in the labor market represent almost 48 percent of the sample.
The distribution of the weekly working hours has a peak at 36-40 hours, which
mainly represents standard full-time jobs. Women with reduced hours are spread
4 The information about the earnings is based on the question: ”What was your labor
income including the payments for overtime hours last month?” The number of working
hours refer to the question: ”How many hours per week including the overtime hours do
you usually work?” Provided that the employee can use up the excess hours of work by
taking time o¤ or the employee is not compensated for additional working hours, we use the
reported contractual working hours. This applies to about 50 percent of the West German
women. The hourly wage rate is then de…ned as monthly earning divided by the monthly
working hours. Thus, di¤erences in the number of days of holiday and absenteeism are not
taken into account.
5 A few women claimed that they work more that 60 hours a week. In view of the legal
limit of 60 working hours a week, we censored the weekly hours at the legal threshold.
8
over the range of 5 to 35 hours, but many of them work between 16 and 20 hours
a week. In view of the fact that agreed working hours never exceed 40 hours
a week by collective agreement, about 6 percent of all employed women in the
sample work overtime.
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Figure 1: Distribution of weekly working hours and hourly wage rates
The average hourly wage rates vary between 13 DM for women working 50 or
more hours and almost 23 DM for the employees with 26 to 30 hours a week.
That is, women who work more than 10 overtime hours a week su¤er high wage
reductions. In Germany, overtime hours are in principle compensated with an ad-
ditional wage premium. Otherwise, overtime work occurs mainly in salaried jobs.
Figure 1 leads one to suggest that either the overtime premiums are avoided or
that the wage for jobs with ”unpaid” overtime work are not as high as expected.
Howe
Figure 1 further shows that jobs with less hours are paid by lower wages than
full-time jobs or extended part-time jobs (26-35 hours). This picture may give
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rise to the supposition that part-time jobs are more often chosen by less quali…ed
and experienced women, so that the wage di¤erentials are caused by selectivity.
Therefore, Figure 2 presents the share of each quali…cation level in four di¤erent
labor supply regimes.6
Note: Unskilled: not completed any vocational training; skilled (type I): apprenticeship; skilled 
(type II) vocational or technical college; (post-)graduated: university degree.
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Figure 2: Share of education level by weekly working hours
Apart from the women working overtime hours, the skilled women (type I) are
the most important group. They represent almost 50 percent of all employees
in the …rst three labor supply categories. In contrast, the shares of the other
quali…cation levels vary more with the number of weekly working hours. 27
percent of the employees who work less than 15 hours are unskilled, but only 13
percent of those working overtime hours.7 Thus, the share of unskilled declines
with increasing working hours. The opposite seems to be true for the graduated
6 In contrast with the nine categories in Figure 1, we now create larger groups because of
the small number of observations in some cells.
7 These …gures are based on very few observations and should therefore be interpreted
with caution.
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women. The share of graduated women rises from 6.6 percent (< 15 hours) to
10 percent for the standard full-time jobs. As a result, the simple selectivity
hypothesis can not fully explain the wage structure. The di¤erences with respect
to the quali…cation level appear to be one possible explanation for the observed
wage di¤erentials between very small part-time jobs and full-time jobs. However,
the wage reductions of over-time jobs must be caused by other factors, such as
individual characteristics of the employees. Another reason could be that the
actual working hours do not exactly refer to the reported earnings of the previous
month. If the payments for the reported overtime hours are not included in the
wages, the hourly wage rate is biased downwards. Hence we will now turn to
the econometric model which enables us to detect the wage-hours pro…les for
di¤erent groups of individuals and to check whether the measurement error of
the hourly wage rate in‡uences the results.
4. The econometric model
4.1 Participation
The decision to enter the labor market (P ) is modeled by a binary choice ap-
proach. The equation of the continuous latent variable is given by:
P ¤ = Z 0 ° + v; (4.1)
Given involuntary unemployment, the actual labor market participation can-
not be interpreted strictly as an individual decision. Thus, the matrix of exoge-
nous variables Z contains both factors which determine the labor supply, such
as quali…cation and the number of small children, and the labor demand, such
as the regional unemployment rate. ° presents the parameter vector to be es-
timated. The assumptions on the properties of the error term v and all other
residuals of the model are given below (see section 4.4). P* is unobservable but
relates to the observable dichotomous variable P (participation status) as:
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P =
½
0 if P ¤ 6 0
1 if P ¤ > 0
¾
4.2 Working Hours
The second equation describes the hours decision. We use a linear speci…cation
with actual weekly working hours as dependent variable.
h = Y 0 ¯ + u (4.2)
where Y is a vector of explanatory variables and ¯ the parameters to be es-
timated. The error term u adds linearly to the hours function. We specify
the reduced form equation of hours worked in a very ‡exible way, so that it is
consistent with almost any structural labor supply model, or is at least a good
approximation. The vector Y also includes variables describing the household
context, such as the number of small children, the marital status and the other
household income. These covariates capture both the opportunity costs of work-
ing and the e¤ect of taxation on labor supply. Thus, the coe¢cients of this
equation should not be interpreted in a structural way.
4.3 Wage rates
We estimate a single wage equation for all employees, irrespective of wether they
work full-time, part-time or any other number of hours:
lnw = ®0 + ®1 ¢X + ®2 ¢ h+ ®3 ¢ h2 + ®4 ¢X ¢ h+ ®5 ¢X ¢ h2 + e (4.3)
The dependent variable is the log gross hourly wage rate of the employed
women. X is the vector of explanatory variables and ®0 to ®5 are elements of
the parameter vector. The unexplained part of the hourly wage rate is captured
by the error term e: In order to estimate the e¤ect of working hours on wages, we
also include hours (h) in the wage equation. Most of the previous studies sug-
gest that hours a¤ect the wage quadratically (Mo¢t, 1984; Tummers/Woittiez,
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1991). As a …rst approach, we also use the quadratic speci…cation of the work-
ing hours, which arises from the …xed costs of work on the one hand and the
declining marginal productivity at high hours on the other hand (Barzel, 1973).
Further, we use interaction terms between the hours and the exogenous variables£
(X ¢ h) and (X ¢ h2)¤ to allow for di¤erent e¤ects of working hours for di¤erent
education levels, experience groups or …rm sizes. If the coe¢cients ®2; ®3;®4 and
®5 turn out to be zero, our wage function is consistent with the standard Mincer
earnings function, that is, working hours do not a¤ect the hourly wage rate.
Second, we apply a more ‡exible approach to estimate the wage e¤ect of
working hours using a linear spline function (Suits et al., 1978). This piece-wise
linear regression does not require any pre-speci…cation of the functional form
of the relation between hours and wages and still allows us to estimate di¤erent
wage-hours pro…les for speci…c groups if individuals. The resulting wage equation
can be written as:
lnw = ®1 ¢X +
Ã
nP
j=1
[¼j + ±j(h¡Hj¡1) ¢Dj]
!
¢Dx + e; (4.4)
where Hj with j 2 f0; :::; n¡ 1g are the frontiers of the di¤erent segments of
the function, the so called knots and Dj with j 2 f1; :::; ng are dummy variables
whose value is 1 for all observations such that Hj¡1 6 h < Hj and is 0 otherwise.
However, this wage equation will be discontinuous at Hj: Therefore we constrain
the values of the coe¢cients ¼j for j 1 2 so that ¼j = ¼j¡1+ ±j¡1(Hj¡1 ¡Hj¡2):
In order to allow for di¤erent wage-hours pro…les for speci…c groups of individuals
we interact this spline function with additional dummy variables (Dx):
We estimate the system of the three equations 4.1 to 4.3 (respectively 4.4)
simultaneously by maximum likelihood.
4.4 Properties of the error terms
The error terms of the three equations (e; u; v) are assumed to be trivariate
normally distributed with mean zero and covariance §. The variance of v
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(Var(v) = §3;3) is normalized to one. The three covariances between the er-
ror terms are identi…ed by the simultaneous maximum likelihood estimation.
4.5 Measurement error in the hours variable
One reason for the high wage reductions of overtime hours (see …gure 1) could
be that the reported working hours do not refer to the earnings in the previous
month. Let’s assume that a woman usually works 5 paid overtime hours a week.
If the employer pays for the overtime hours every month, thus the declared
earnings include the payments for the …ve additional hours, the hourly wage
rate is measured exactly. However, this is only one possible agreement about
the timing of the overtime reward. There also may be …rms which remunerate
the overtime hours after they exceed a certain threshold as a result of which the
usual working hours do not correspond to the hours for which earnings have been
reported. The same problem arises if the additional hours occur very irregularly.
Since we do not have any information about whether the reported earnings
actually include overtime premiums, the match between the observed working
hours and earnings is not absolutely reliable.
In order to check whether these measurement problems reinforce the strong
decline in hourly wage rates for long working hours, we slightly modify the econo-
metric model described above. In contrast to the hours equation 4.2 we now take
the weekly working hours in logs. Let’s assume that the true hours8 h¤ relate to
the observed hours h as:
log(h) = log(h¤) + » ; (4.5)
where » is the measurement error. Since in our model the hourly wage rate is
a function of the working hours, the de…nition of the wage rate converts into:
log(w) = log(y)¡ log(h) = log(y)¡ log(h¤)¡ » = log(w¤)¡ » : (4.6)
8 That is, the working hours which actually refer to the earnings of the previous month.
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Applying these changes to the wage and hours equation discussed above results
in the following model:9
log(w) = ®1 ¢X + ®2 ¢ log(h) + e¡ ®2» ¡ » = ®1 ¢X + ®2 ¢ log(h) + " (4.7)
log(h) = Y 0 ¯ + u+ » = Y 0 ¯ + À : (4.8)
We can see that the measurement error » adds linearly with opposite signs
to the two equations and enters the new error terms " and À. As a result, the
measurement error » causes a negative correlation between the wage and the
hours equation.10 Assuming that the measurement error matters, one would
expect that the correlation between the two equations is negative, or at least
smaller compared to the correlation ½eu.
5. Estimation results
Before discussing the estimation results, we will brie‡y address the identi…ca-
tion problem. We estimate reduced-form equations of the participation and the
hours equation. The wage function is the only structural equation.11 Therefore,
the question is whether the wage equation can be distinguished from a linear
combination of all other functions in the simultaneous model. In principle the
model is identi…ed by the functional form. In addition to that, we insert several
9 As the participation equation is not a¤ected by these modi…cations, we refrain from the
repeated presentation of the complete model. For simplicity, we assume that the wage rate
is lineary dependent on log(h). However, including other hour variables log(h)2 or any
interactions does not impair the correction of the measurement error.
10 This also holds for the previous model. However, the error term e of the wage equation 4.3
is not a linear function of the measurement error », thus the correlation of the measurement
errors in the wage and hours equation should be smaller. The measurement errors are
accounted for exactly only if log(h) enters linearly in the wage equation.
11 This means, that the three equations are resolved such that the hours- and participation
decision depends only on explanatory variables which are not determined within this model.
However, the wage equation contains among others the number of working hours.
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exclusion restrictions. First, we exclude all family characteristics, such as the
number of children, from the wage equation. Thus, it is assumed that children
a¤ect the wage rate only through the employment breaks, which are captured by
the experience variable. The information about the children living in the house-
hold enters the hours and the participation equation in two di¤erent ways. For
the participation function, we use one variable indicating the age of the youngest
child and another for the number of children in the household. This speci…cation
serves as a measure of the time needed for the children. In the hours equation,
we use the number of children by age groups, because the age structure is more
likely to measure the …scal burden of the children in the household. Second, the
marital status, participation status of the partner12, and the other household
income are excluded from the wage equation. In contrast to the wage equation,
we do not use actual years of employment but potential experience in the partic-
ipation and hours equation in order to avoid endogeneity. Furthermore, the …xed
costs of working, measured by a dummy variable indicating whether at least one
member of the household is in need of care13 or whether the observed individual
is a single mother with a child younger than 4 years, enter the participation
equation. In order to capture the labor demand restrictions, we also include the
regional unemployment rate.
In a …rst step, we estimate the simultaneous model based on the equations
4.1 to 4.3. We present four models with di¤erent restrictions concerning the
correlation between the error terms of the three equations and the structure of
the wage equation. Model 1 is the most restrictive framework. It is assumed that
working hours do not a¤ect the wage rate and that participation, hours worked
12 Bernasco (1994) points out that the employment status of the husband a¤ects the par-
ticipation of Dutch wives. Women whose husband is employed have a higher participation
probability than wives of inactive men. However, the female occupational prestige, which
is among others a function of income, does not depend on the employment status of the
men.
13 Persons who care for their old parents or other relatives face high entrance costs to the
labor market, because they would have to pay for a geriatric nurse or an old people’s home,
which can be extremely expensive according to the state of health.
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and wages are mutually independent. Model 2 drops the later restriction. Model
3 includes hours and hours squared in the wage equation, imposing that the
impact of working hours on the wage rate is just a shift e¤ect, which is the same
for all individuals. It also allows for correlation among the error terms e; u and
v: Finally, we check in Model 4 whether the wage structure, such as the returns
to education or experience, is determined by the hours worked. After that we
compare the estimation results of the …nal speci…cation with the corresponding
model with log(hours) and the model using a spline function for the working
hours in the wage equation (4.4).
Presenting the estimation results, we give most attention to the wage equation,
because the auxiliary equations of hours and employment status are reduced-form
estimates. The estimation results of equation 4.1 and 4.2 are given in table A2
in the Appendix.
The wage function is modeled on the basis of an extended human capital ap-
proach. The education level is measured by three dummy variables.14 The actual
labor market experience is described by two continuous variables, the number
of years in full-time employment and the years in part-time work. However, the
returns to part-time experience turned out to be insigni…cant in all wage regres-
sions and therefore we excluded them from the set of explanatory variables. One
explanation could be that part-time employees participate less in training pro-
grams such that their learning by doing is much slower.15 In addition to these
human capital variables, we include dummy variables to control for the …rm size
and the industry sector of the employed women. The estimation results of the
14 The di¤erent quali…cation levels are de…ned in …gure 2. An alternative approach is to
include occupational dummies instead of or in addition to the vocational training. We
refrain from this speci…cation, because the occupational status involves some risk of an
endogeneity problem.
15 Whether …rm speci…c human capital creates additional wage growth is still an open ques-
tion. Mincer/Jovanovic (1981) and Topel (1991), as two prominent examples, concluded
that there are large returns to seniority. In contrast to theses results, recents studies for the
US (Altonji/Williams, 1997) and for Germany (Dustmann/Meghir, 1998) do not con…rm
that tenure generates additional wage growth.
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wage equation (see 4.3) of the four models described above are presented in Table
1.
The wage function of Model 1 corresponds to the standard OLS wage regres-
sion with log hourly wage rate as dependent variable. Wages increase with the
education level and the …rm size. Also the experience variables generate the
expected dome shaped curve, that is, wages rise with labor market experience
up to 28 years in full-time employment. The estimated wage reduction for addi-
tional years in full-time employment may be partly due to age or cohort e¤ects
for which we do not control. Comparing the …rst two models illustrates that
allowing for correlation between the error terms of the three equations improves
the …t of the model signi…cantly.16 However, the coe¢cients change only slightly.
Albeit the correlation between wages and hours is positive, it is very small and
insigni…cant. In other words, unobserved characteristics which rise the gross
wage rate also tend to increase the working hours, but the e¤ect is not very
important. However, the negative correlation with the error terms of the par-
ticipation equation is surprising. Presuming that the unobserved variables are
personal characteristics, such as ambition, motivation or the thirst for action,
one would expect that the residuals of the participation equation and the wage
and hours equations, respectively, are correlated positively. In our case the op-
posite is true. Women who have a high unexplained probability to work earn
ceteris paribus lower wages and work less hours. One explanation could be that
women in precarious economic situations, for which we cannot precisely control,
are more likely willing to accept jobs with lower wages and less hours. Espe-
cially recipients of social welfare may avoid to earn too much additional income
in order to stay entitled to their bene…ts. Another consideration is that women
with small children, who have a low predicted probability of working intend to
take up working after the child break. In the long term is seems rational that
16 The test statistic of the likelihood ratio test is 14.5 and the critical value of Â23 is 7.8.
Furthermore, the Wald-test of the three correlation coe¢cients is signi…cant as well (see
Table 1).
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they temporally accept a job with less hours and a lower wage rate in order to
keep in touch with the labor market. Thus, the negative correlation with the
participation equation may be due to the life cycle maximization of the individ-
uals. Finally, the negative correlation between the hours and the participation
equation could be caused by the bimodal distribution of the working hours.
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Table 1: Estimation results of the wage functions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
coe¤. t coe¤. t coe¤. t coe¤. t
constant 2.749 72.80 2.807 65.53 2.588 16.08 2.724 16.59
hours 0.030 5.78 0.022 2.54
hours2 -0.061 -9.48 -0.055 -3.88
unskilled -0.132 -5.32 -0.103 -3.85 -0.076 -2.46 -0.092 -3.19
skilled (type II) 0.052 2.26 0.055 2.35 0.059 2.51 0.056 2.48
(post-)graduate 0.346 10.85 0.337 10.45 0.376 11.36 0.375 11.85
ft. experience 0.026 7.80 0.023 6.94 0.021 5.90 -0.045 -2.68
ft. experience2 -0.045 -4.66 -0.040 -4.04 -0.033 -3.22 0.188 3.48
20-200 empl. 0.018 0.70 0.016 0.63 0.031 1.23 0.026 1.06
201-2000 empl. 0.159 6.53 0.153 6.28 0.143 6.00 0.138 5.90
>2000 empl. 0.205 8.33 0.204 8.30 0.193 8.14 0.193 8.23
energy, mining -0.031 -0.51 -0.036 -0.59 -0.023 -0.38 -0.020 -0.34
metal industry -0.027 -0.53 -0.026 -0.53 -0.039 -0.81 -0.044 -0.91
other industry -0.119 -2.53 -0.113 -2.41 -0.127 -2.82 -0.130 -2.91
trade, service -0.214 -6.16 -0.207 -5.96 -0.185 -5.54 -0.204 -1.86
transport -0.039 -0.73 -0.031 -0.57 -0.039 -0.77 -0.041 -0.81
banking 0,060 1,33 0,060 1,33 0,060 1,40 0,064 1,49
education, health 0,049 1,44 0,055 1.63 0.052 1.58 0.051 1.58
public service -0.019 -0.47 -0.010 -0.25 -0.021 -0.54 -0.023 -0.62
other sectors -0.075 -0.87 -0.062 -0.72 -0.060 -0.72 -0.047 -0.57
interactions:
exp.¤ hours 0.004 2.99
exp.2 ¤ hours -0.012 -3.58
exp. ¤ hours2 -0.004 -1.91
exp.2 ¤ hours2 0.014 2.62
trade/service ¤ h. -0.005 -0.59
trade/service ¤ h.2 0.015 1.13
½wage;hours 0.06 1.49 0.261 2.24 0.141 1.23
½wage;participation -0.28 -3.02 -0.495 -2.87 -0.362 -2.08
½hours;participation -0.29 -2.20 -0.312 -2.96 -0.276 -2.53
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Table 1 (continued):
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
mean log likelihood -2.567 -2.564 -2.545 -2.539
likelihood ratio Test Â23 = 14:5 Â
2
2 = 91:3 Â
2
6 = 32:7
Wald-Test statistics:
hours, hours2 (Â22 = 5:99) 96.72 26.52
experience ¤ h. (Â24 = 9:49) 26.11
trade,services¤ h. (Â22 = 5:99) 6.41
½w;h; ½w;p; ½h;p (Â
2
3 = 7:82) 14.19 11.16 7.87
number of observations 2415 2415 2415 2415
.
Note: the reference group are skilled women (type I) who work in the chemical or electrical
goods industry or in the engineering sector and are employed by a …rm with less that
20 employees. The de…nition of the other quali…cation levels are given in …gure 2. The
experience is measured by the years in full-time employment. The variables hours2 and
full-time experience2 are divided by 100. The likelihood ratio test compares the actual with
the preceding model.
In the next step we relax the assumption that the amount of working hours
does not a¤ect the hourly wage rate (Model 3). Hence we include hours and
hours squared in the wage equation, which are highly signi…cant and improve
the …t of the model. According to previous studies our estimates lead to a
S-shaped budget curve. The hourly wage rate increases up to the peak of 25
hours a week and starts to decrease afterwards. Thus, our results are consistent
with the …ndings in other countries (Mo¢t, 1984; Tummers/Woittiez, 1991).
Although we control for various variables, we can still …nd a signi…cant decline
of wages for women working overtime hours. If we take a look at the estimated
covariance matrix, we realize that taking the labor supply decision into account
becomes more important now. The positive correlation between wages and hours
increases and is signi…cant. To put it di¤erently, there are some unobserved
characteristics which in‡uence the wage rate and the hours decision in the same
way. This implies that ignoring the endogeneity of the working hours leads to
lower estimated wage rates for jobs with reduced working hours and higher wage
rates for people working more hours (see …gure 6 in the Appendix).
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Figure 3: Wage-hours curves for selected groups
Up to this point it has been assumed that the impact of the amount of working
hours on the wage rate is the same for all individuals. Even if the way how the
working hours in‡uence the hourly wage rate should be independent of quali…-
cation level, experience, …rm-size or industry sector, the intensity of the e¤ect
could vary among di¤erent groups of employees. We ran a variety of regressions
and identi…ed di¤erent hours e¤ects for employees in the service and trade sector
and for di¤erent experience levels (Model 4). The education level and the …rm
size turned out to be irrelevant for the shape of the wage-hours pro…le. Two
primary observations should be made about these results. First, the assump-
tion that the impact of working hours on wages is the same for all individuals
must be strongly rejected.17 Second, the correlation among the equations of the
simultaneous model decrease and one of three correlation coe¢cients becomes
insigni…cant again.
Figure 3 presents the wage-hours curves for women with di¤erent experience
17 The likelihood-ratio test between model 3 and model 4 generates a test statistic of 32.7.
The critical value of Â26 is 12.6.
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levels and those working in the trade or service sector. If not de…ned otherwise,
the characteristics of the reference group are valid. The previous labor market
experience tends to increase the hump of the wage-hours curve. Furthermore,
additional experience raises the hourly wage rate for any number of working
hours. Skilled women with 5 to 15 years of full-time experience earn approxi-
mately the same hourly wage rate if they work less than 15 hours a week. Once
they increase their labor supply, the wages of women with more experience rise
much faster. This indicates that previous labor market experience becomes no-
ticeable only if women work more hours. Unless they work more than 15 hours,
their productivity does not seem to be increased by previous experience. The
highest hourly wage rate for skilled women with 15 years of experience is paid to
those working 30 hours a week. Less experienced women reach their maximum
at less hours. For a standard full-time job (38 hours), the gross wage di¤erential
between skilled women with 5 and 15 year of experience, keeping all other char-
acteristics constant, is 4.20 DM per hour, that is 686 DM per month. In contrast
to these curves, wages in the service or trade sector grow very moderately with
additional working hours. Furthermore, the wage-hours locus is on a signi…cant
lower level.
Despite the di¤erent shapes of the wage-hours curves, they all have in common
that the hourly wage rate for over-time hours falls substantially. This result is in
line with the …ndings of Tummers and Woittiez (1991) for the Netherlands. To
check whether the shape of the wage-hours curve is biased due to the measure-
ment error in hours, we reestimate Model 4 based on the modi…ed equations 4.7
and 4.8. Apart from the variables which are interacted with the hours, the coef-
…cients of the other variables di¤er hardly. The estimation results are presented
in Table A3 in the Appendix.
Apart from the variables which are not interacted with the hours, the coef-
…cients of the other variables di¤er signi…cantly. To illustrate the e¤ect on the
wage-hours locus, Figure 4 presents the resulting pro…les. Similar to the previous
results, additional years in full-time employment shift the wage-hours pro…le up-
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Figure 4: Wage-hours curves of the log(hours)-model
wards. Also the estimated wage rate for women who are employed in the service
or trade sector is much lower and the curve is ‡atter.. In contrast to …gure 3, the
hourly wages rise much faster at the beginning of the hours distribution. Also
striking is that the decline of the wage rate for full-time jobs and overtime work
is moderate. This leads one to suppose that for high number of working hours,
the reported pre-month earnings do not include the rewards for these overtime
hours, that is, the previous results are strongly driven by the measurement er-
ror. To check wether the potential measurement error is better captured in the
log(hours)-model, we need to compare the correlation coe¢cients ½wage;hours in
the two models. Contrary to our expectations, the correlation coe¢cient did not
decrease. This indicates that the measurement error (»), provided it matters,
does not add linearly to the log of the true hours (h¤) as we assumed in 4.5.18
Thus, the log(hours)-model is not better suited to get rid of measurement error.
18 However, the sensitivity analysis shows that the size of the correlation coe¢cient in the
two alternative models depends strongly on the speci…cation of the auxiliary equations.
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Nevertheless, the log(hours)-model could provide a better …t of the entire
model. Therefore, we apply a test for non-nested models (Vuong, 1989) which
is based on the Kullbach-Leibler information criterion. The statistic used here
is the adjusted di¤erence of the log-likelihoods divided by an estimator for the
variance of this di¤erence. The test statistic is standard normal under the null
of no divergence. We subtracted the transformed log-likelihood value of the
log(hours)-model from our basic model (Model 4). Thus, a signi…cant positive
test statistic would point to superiority of the basic model. In fact, the value
turned out to be signi…cantly positive (11.8), that is, the log(hours)-model is
rejected.
The previous results show that the shape of the wage-hours pro…les depends
strongly on the assumption of the functional form. Therefore, we use a linear
spline function in order to estimate the impact of working hours on wage rates.
First, we grouped the observed working hours into six categories (5-15 h; 16-
20 h; 21-25 h; 26-37 h; 38-45 h; 46-60 h), that is, we de…ne …ve knots.19 It
follows from this that if a woman works less than 16 hours a week, D1 is set to
one and D2; :::;D6 are equal to zero. Second, we de…ned two dummy variables
for di¤erent experience levels. In order to allow for di¤erent wage-hours curves
for speci…c groups of employees, we multiply these dummy variables with spline
dummies D1; :::; D6: The estimation results are presented in the appendix and
the corresponding wages are shown in …gure 5.
Due to the linear splines, the computed wage-hours locus is not a smooth line.
Striking is that the variance of the hourly wage rates is much smaller compared to
the previous …gures. They vary only between 12 and 20 DM per hour. Another
special feature is that the wage curves di¤er very much in the category for jobs
with less than 15 hours. Despite these di¤erences to the previous …ndings, the
wage reduction for overtime hours turns out to be a robust result, even if they
are much smaller in this speci…cation. A closer look into the data indicates that
19 At the beginning we de…ned another knot at 30 hours. Since the slopes of the two
adjointed splines did not di¤er signi…cantly, we dropped this knot.
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Figure 5: Wage-hours curves based on the spline functions
about 60 percent of those women who do overtime work are not compensated
for their e¤ort. This may be due to the fact that in our sample only 17 percent
are blue collar workers of which not all are covered by the collective agreement
of the unions (see Table A4 in the Appendix). Thus, we can not observe the
statutory overtime premiums for blue collar workers. One explanation for these
unpaid overtime hours could be that people temporary invest much time in their
job in order to be promoted for a higher position.
First, let’s have a look at the wages of women with more than 10 years of full-
time experience. The hourly wage rate increases moderately while these women
work less then 15 hours a week and rises very fast thereafter. However, there
exist no wage di¤erential between full-time jobs without overtime and part-time
jobs with 20 or more hours a week. Less experienced women earn the highest
hourly wage rates at about 20 hours a week. However, the decline of the hourly
wage rate between 20 and 25 hours is only signi…cant on the 10%-level. Again,
the returns to experience are higher in jobs with more working hours. For women
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who work in the trade or service sector, the hourly wage rate decreases up to
the threshold of 15 hours. This unusual result may be due to the fact, that 84
percent of these women do not pay social security premiums.20 Given they can
not freely decide about the number of working hours in these jobs, they accept
lower wages for a 15 hours job in order not to exceed the threshold of 580 DM
per month. Thereafter, the hourly wage rate increases moderately and is similar
to the wage-hours pro…le of the less experienced women in the other sectors.
6. Conclusion
Do part-time workers earn lower hourly wage rates than full-timers? In Ger-
many, part-time jobs still have the image of lousy jobs. If this is true, the wage
dispersion does not only a¤ect the income distribution, but has also far-reaching
implications for the labor supply decision of individuals. Negative wage premi-
ums for part-time jobs, for example, would decrease the labor supply for those
jobs. Economic theory provides many reasons why and how the gross hourly
wage rate could be determined by the working hours. However, the shape of the
wage-hours pro…le is not clearly determined by the theoretical arguments.
Empirical studies for di¤erent countries do not provide clear evidence about
the wage structure. The di¤erent results may be partly due to the di¤erent
econometric methods. Previous studies for Germany suggest that women with
marginal or part-time jobs earn lower wages than full-time employed women even
if the quali…cation level and other explanatory variables are controlled for. How-
ever, these studies have two shortcomings. First, the individual labor supply
decision is assumed to be exogenous, which is not consistent with microeconomic
theory. Second, the model does not allow for di¤erent wage-hours pro…les for
speci…c groups of individuals. Therefore, we use a simultaneous model which
fully takes into account the labor supply decision. Furthermore, we relax the
assumption that the e¤ect of working hours on wages is the same for all individ-
20 In the other sectors, this share is about 65 percent.
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uals.
Three primary observations should be made about our results. First, for West
German women, the exogeneity assumption of working hours in the wage regres-
sion must be rejected if the wage-hours locus is assumed to be the same for all
individuals. As a result of this the wage rate of full-time employees is overesti-
mated in the standard OLS estimates. However, if we allow for compositional
wage di¤erences between part-timers and full-timers, the OLS estimates seem to
do a rather good job. These results show that in principle the labor supply de-
cision should be fully taken into account, because the unobserved characteristics
may be crucial in the speci…c case.
Second, our estimates show that the hourly wage rate is strongly a¤ected by
the working hours. But, the shape of the wage-hours pro…le depends strongly
on the assumption about the functional form. Therefore, we estimate a linear
spline function, which does not require any pre-speci…cation of the mathematical
form of the relation between hours and wages. Third, we detect di¤erent wage-
hours pro…les for some speci…c groups. Women working in the trade or service
sector experience a ‡atter wage-hours curve than those in other sectors. Also the
previous labor market experience determines the shape of the wage-hours locus.
Despite these di¤erences, the wage reduction for jobs with less than 16 hours a
week and for overtime hours turns out to be a robust result. However, the hourly
wage rate of jobs with 20 to 38 hours does not di¤er signi…cantly.
These results show, that the wage distribution does not seem to be the driving
factor for the marginal importance of part-time work for West Germany women.
Especially jobs with 30 to 35 hours are very rare, even if the wage rate does not
di¤er from other part-time or full-time jobs. Possibly, the creation of a 30-hour
job causes more organizational e¤ort than just dividing a full-time job in two 20-
hour jobs and can therefore only be carried out by very estimable employees. In
this setting the employers would only grant a request for an extended part-time
job, if the employee represents important human capital to the …rm and if there
is a risk that the woman is leaving otherwise.
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Another reason could be that a 30-hours job is less compatible with the avail-
able child care facilities so that women are forced to accept either a standard
part-time job or to leave the labor market. Furthermore, they would have to
spend much money on child rearing, which only makes sense if they have a high
income. Further research is necessary to decide whether women are constraint
with respect to extended part-time jobs or whether other factors prevent them
to choose these high paid jobs.
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Appendix
In our framework, the multivariate econometric problem involves both contin-
uous (wages and hours) and discrete variables (participation). Therefore, the
likelihood function is made up by term which are probability densities with re-
spect to the limited dependent variable and integrated probability functions with
respect to the continuous variables. This composition is based on Bayes’ theo-
rem. Under normality assumptions, a joint density function can be decomposed
in a partial density function and a conditional density function.
'(Y 1; Y 2;¹1; ¹2;§) = '(Y 2;¹2;§22)| {z } ¢Ã(Y 1;¹¤;§¤)| {z }; (1)
p.d.f. c.d.f
where Y 1 and Y 2 are the discrete and continuous variables of interest and ¹1
and ¹2 are their expected values. The correlation matrix § is composed of
§11 = cov(Y 1), §22 = cov(Y 2) and §12 = cov(Y 1; Y 2). Then, the distribution
of Y 1 conditional on Y 2 can be written as Y 1 j Y 2 » N(¹¤;§¤); where ¹¤ =
¹1 +§12(§22)¡1(Y 2 ¡ ¹2) and §¤ = §11 ¡ §12(§22)¡1§21:
The likelihood function of our model can be divided into the likelihood contri-
bution of the non-participants and the part of the active workers.
L = P(P ¤ < 0) + f(lnw; h) ¢ P(P ¤ > 0 j lnw; h) (2)
The …rst part describes the probability of not working in the labor market and the
second term describes the joint distribution of the observed wage rates and the
corresponding working hours of the employed people. The likelihood contribution
of these individuals is presented as a partially integrated normal density. In terms
of the above speci…ed model (see equation 4.1 to 4.3) the likelihood function can
be rewritten as
L = (h = 0) ¢ P(v < ¡° ¢ Z) + (h > 0) ¢ f(lnw; h) ¢ P(v > ¡° ¢ Z j lnw; h)
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= (h = 0) ¢ ©(¡° ¢ Z) + (h > 0) ¢ '(lnw; lnh;¹;§) ¢ ©
µ
¹¤
§¤
¶
; (3)
where ¹¤ and §¤ are de…ned above.
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics of the sample
mean std. dev. min. max.
log(wages) 2.99 0.4 1.6 4.0
working hours 31.46 10.8 6.0 60.0
years in full-time experience (in years) 8.60 8.0 0.0 43.0
potential years of experience (in years) 21.38 11.7 0.0 45.0
other household income (in 1000 DM) 3.28 2.2 0.0 19.4
income of the spouse (in 1000 DM) 1.86 2.2 0.0 14.0
regional unemployment rate 9.26 1.8 7.0 14.0
taste for work -1.62 9.9 -46.7 20.0
freq. percent
participation 1262 52.3
unskilled 586 24.3
skilled (type I) 1084 44.9
skilled (type II) 544 22.5
(post-)graduated 201 8.3
< 20 employees 457 36.2
20 - 200 employees 224 17.7
201 - 2000 employees 270 21.4
> 2000 employees 311 24.6
chemical/electrical ind., engineering 119 9.4
energy mining 34 2.7
metal industry 57 4.5
other industry 71 5.6
trade, service 290 23.0
transport 50 4.0
banking 84 6.7
education, health 405 32.1
public service 137 10.9
other sectors 15 1.2
kids in the household (Y/N) 1081 44.8
lone mother, relative in need of care 87 3.6
married 1637 67.8
participation of the spouse 1289 53.4
# observations 2415 100
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Table A2: Hours equation and participation probability (Model 4)
hours participation
coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
constant 40.523 31.99 constant 1.181 5.85
# kids < 3 year -6.712 -2.50 kids -1.309 -8.72
# kids 4-6 year -9.159 -4.08 AGEKID 0.099 8.34
# kids 7-16 years -6.774 -3.02 KIDS16 -0.390 -1.92
unskilled 0.632 0.84 unskilled -0.314 -4.27
skilled (type II) 1.160 1.82 skilled (type II) -0.001 -0.02
(post-)graduated 1.725 1.76 (post-)graduated 0.103 0.82
pot. experience -0.070 -0.55 pot. experience 0.072 5.41
pot. experience2=100 -0.212 -0.74 pot. experience2=100 -0.193 -7.02
married -2.568 -3.78 married -0.126 -1.62
OINC -0.006 -0.03 OINC -0.270 -7.74
OINC2=1000 -0.260 1.25 OINC2=1000 0.173 5.19
OINC * KIDS16 -0.309 -1.86 SPINC 0.337 4.24
SPINC -0.371 -0.96 SPINC2=100 -3.917 -4.00
SPINC2=100 -5.293 -0.736 PART_SP -0.304 -1.90
taste for work 0.074 2.69 taste for work 0.010 3.47
KIDS16 * experience 0.031 0.55 KIDS16 * experience -0.002 -0.41
KIDS16 * SCHOOL 0.220 1.63 KIDS16 * SCHOOL 0.023 1.94
regional unempl. rate -0.051 -3.31
CARE -0.128 -1.45
Note: OINC: other net household income ( in 1000 DM); SPINO: income of the spouse (in 1000
DM); KIDS16: number of children up to the age 16; SCHOOL; years of education; AGEKID:
age of the youngest kid in the household; PART_SP: participation of the spouse; CARE: lone
mothers with children up to 3 years or existence of people in need of care in the household; the
variable ”taste for work” is created by a factor analysis from the question ”How important are
the following thinks for your life”. Among the topics which are evaluated by the individuals
are (1) to ful…l oneself, (2) success on the job, (3) to have children, (4) to be happily married
or (5) to be able to a¤ord something. These items are used to create a factor named taste for
work.
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Table A3: Estimation results of alternative models
log(hours)- Model with spline function
model I II III IV
coe¤. t coe¤. t coe¤. t coe¤. t coe¤. t
constant 0.797 0.83 2.583 19.47
log(hours) 1.664 2.98 - -
log(hours)2 -3.052 -3.55 - -
unskilled -0.070 -2.00 -0.089 -3.22
skilled (type II) 0.057 2.33 0.054 2.44
(post-)grad. 0.354 10.60 0.379 11.92
full-time exp. -0.327 -2.53 0.015 2.42
full-time exp.2 1.218 2.81 -0.023 -1.56
20-200 empl. 0.009 0.34 0.026 1.06
201-2000 empl. 0.138 5.62 0.131 5.66
>2000 empl. 0.196 8.22 0.179 7.68
energy, mining -0.025 -0.43 -0.026 -0.45
metal industry -0.038 -0.79 -0.037 -0.78
other industry -0.120 -2.69 -0.118 -2.68
trade, serv. 2.134 2.66 0.225 1.82
transport -0.043 -0.83 -0.035 -0.69
banking 0.066 1.54 0.069 1.61
educ., health 0.052 1.61 0.059 1.84
public service -0.027 -0.70 -0.023 -0.62
other sectors -0.052 -0.62 -0.040 -0.50
interactions: spline dummies
exp.¤ log(h) 0.185 2.22 D1 0.016 2.43 -0.007 -1.42 -0.012 -1.91 -0.036 -3.88
exp.2 ¤ log(h) -0.672 -2.47 D2 0.007 0.84 0.024 2.14 0.021 1.56 0.017 1.47
exp. ¤ log(h)2 -0.239 -1.80 D3 -0.012 -1.76 0.004 0.43 0.015 1.60 0.020 2.29
exp.2 ¤ log(h)2 0.884 2.10 D4 -0.001 -0.25 -0.003 -0.98 -0.001 -0.31 0.000 0.04
TS ¤ log(h) -1.575 -3.01 D5 -0.019 -2.69 0.009 0.93 0.010 1.21 -0.005 -0.66
TS ¤ log(h)2 2.581 3.07 D6 -0.004 -0.51 -0.017 -1.95 -0.007 -0.85 0.002 0.35
½w;h 0.247 1.51 0.143 1.29
½w;p -0.597 -2.84 -0.381 -2.55
½h;p -0.336 -2.00 -0.283 -2.41
? log likelih. -0.856 -2.529
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Note: See Table 1. The …rst column of the spline-model refers to skilled (type I) women
with less than …ve years of full-time employment. The third and …fth column presents
the spline function for women with 5 to 10 years and for those with more than 10 years
of full-time employment. The last two columns describe the wage-hours pro…le of women
working in the service sector.
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Figure 6: Wage-hours pro…les with exogenous and endogenous hours (model 3)
Table A4: Employees with pay agreement by a union
no overtime work overtime worka
blue collar white collar blue collar white collar
# observations 231 924 18 89
in percent 20.0 % 80.0 % 16.8 % 83.2 %
with pay agreement 164 699 15 59
in percent 19.0 % 81.0 % 20.3 % 79.7 %
a Women who work more than 38 hours a week and also more than their contractual
working hours.
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